Measuring the Distribution of Spitefulness by Kimbrough, Erik & Reiss, Philipp
Measuring the Distribution of Spitefulness
Erik O. Kimbrough1*, J. Philipp Reiss2
1Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada, 2Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University, Maastricht, Limburg,
The Netherlands
Abstract
Spiteful, antisocial behavior may undermine the moral and institutional fabric of society, producing disorder, fear, and
mistrust. Previous research demonstrates the willingness of individuals to harm others, but little is understood about how
far people are willing to go in being spiteful (relative to how far they could have gone) or their consistency in spitefulness
across repeated trials. Our experiment is the first to provide individuals with repeated opportunities to spitefully harm
anonymous others when the decision entails zero cost to the spiter and cannot be observed as such by the object of spite.
This method reveals that the majority of individuals exhibit consistent (non-)spitefulness over time and that the distribution
of spitefulness is bipolar: when choosing whether to be spiteful, most individuals either avoid spite altogether or impose
the maximum possible harm on their unwitting victims.
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Introduction
The Stanford Prison Experiment revealed the startling facility
with which individuals lapse into antisocial and sadistic behavior
when given the means and opportunity [1,2]. Given the chance,
individuals may readily abandon the peaceable character common
to their daily lives and systematically and brutally mistreat others.
Similar destructive tendencies are evident following breakdowns in
traditional mechanisms of social control, as in the looting and
indiscriminate vandalism that often follow in the aftermath of
natural disasters and political demonstrations [3]. Under less
extreme conditions, scattered acts of spitefulness nevertheless
occur frequently, from locals pettily misleading tourists to children
bullying their smaller peers.
Explanations for these (mis-)behaviors variously emphasize the
importance of situational factors (e.g. dehumanization, differences
in relative power, anonymity, action unobservability) [1,2,4–6]
and individual characteristics such as personal history and
personality [7–9]. However, evidence from twin studies also
suggests that anti-social behavior has a strong genetic component
[10].
When we call an action ‘‘spiteful’’, we mean that it directly
imposes harm on another and provides no immediate benefit to
the spiteful actor. Our notion of spite differs from that typically
employed by evolutionary biologists in that the latter require the
spiter to undertake an (expected) cost when reducing the relative
fitness of the other [11,12]. Costly spite has been observed in some
non-human species, e.g. social insects [13] as well as in humans
[14–18].
However, many empirical studies of spiteful behavior with
human subjects suffer from identification problems. In the case of
the classic social-psychology research [1,2], it is unclear to what
degree spiteful actions are undertaken as a result of implicit or
explicit experimenter demand as opposed to individual desire to
do harm. In ultimatum games, there is debate over the motivations
for decisions to reject non-zero offers (see e.g. [19]). However,
since the decision to reject an offer is all or none, even if rejections
represent spite (as claimed in [16]), it is still impossible to measure
the extent of spitefulness. In the public goods games reported in
[17], it is unclear whether the observed behavior is spite or merely
an attempt to signal current dissatisfaction with the goal of
promoting future cooperation. Recent experiments on costly
‘antisocial punishment’, in which some individuals actively punish
cooperative others has been observed in a broad range of cultures
and environments, improve upon these studies because they
directly measure the extent to which individuals are willing to
endure costs to impose harm on others [15,20], and recent models
suggest that such behavior may be a result of selection [21].
However, in environments where spite is costly, individuals face an
unobservable tradeoff between the costs and benefits of being
spiteful. The presence of this tradeoff complicates inference about
spiteful strategies because measured spite will be sensitive to the
relative costs of spite to the spiter and to the target.
One advantage of studying spite in auctions, particularly second
price auctions, is that spite can be measured in the intentional
increase of the price that another bidder must pay. This element
was recognized in previous studies of spite in auctions. For
example, [22] report an experiment in which subjects in two-
bidder, asymmetric second-price and ascending bid auctions with
complete information on other bidders’ values. They observe that
lower value subjects overbid their values more frequently than
higher value subjects. Similarly, in the auctions reported in [18],
overbidding one’s value may be explained by spite, but in both
experiments, subjects submit bids without knowledge of the
current high bid so that these bids still imply some risk of winning
the auction. This feature inhibits measurement of spite as some
overbidding may also be explained by judgment errors and/or a
desire to win the item, regardless of cost. See also, [23] for an
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earlier paper modeling spiteful preferences in auctions which
potentially explains overbidding in first-price auctions.
Evidence from mosquitos indicates that when the costs are
borne only by the target, spiteful behaviors can and will persist
[24]. In our experiment, spite is also costless to the spiter, so that
we can directly observe the underlying willingness to do harm.
Although (non-)spitefulness is a prominent behavioral pattern,
little is known about how observed harm compares to the maximum
harm that could have been done or to what degree (non-
)spitefulness is stable within individuals over repeated trials. To
isolate these aspects of spite, we report an incentivized laboratory
experiment, holding situational factors constant, in which we can
observe spiteful behavior, and we ask: when individuals have
means and opportunity to anonymously harm others at zero
personal cost, what is the prevalence, extent and individual
consistency of spitefulness? Is there heterogeneity of spitefulness
across individuals?
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next
section, we introduce the experimental design. The following
sections report our results and a discussion of their implications.
Then, we provide a detailed description of our experimental
procedures, and Appendix S1 provides a copy of our instructions.
Experimental Design
To generate opportunities to observe spiteful behavior and
measure the extent of spitefulness, subjects participate in a
sequence of 16 market periods in each of which they attempt to
buy a single unit of a fictitious item. In each of the 16 periods, one
unit of supply is available for purchase in a two-stage auction, and
unlimited supply of an identical item is available at a fixed price
after the auction ends. In the first stage of the auction, bidders are
informed about their value and the fixed price at which they can
buy after the auction, and they submit an initial bid for the
auctioned item. In the second stage, everyone is informed about
the highest initial bid, and subjects submit their final bids. The
item is allocated to the highest bidder at a price equal to the second
highest final bid, so our auctions represent stylized versions of those
employed by the auction website eBay [25,26]. Subjects must
submit a final bid, and it must be at least as high as their initial bid,
but they are permitted to resubmit the same bid. Those subjects
who do not purchase an item at auction can then purchase it in the
aftermarket at the fixed price.
We call a bidder spiteful if she increases the final auction price
with no intention of winning the auction. By submitting a final bid
higher than her own initial bid but also lower than the highest initial
bid, a spiteful bidder can increase the price paid by the winning
bidder (thereby reducing that person’s earnings) at no cost to
herself. Typically in auctions, spiteful bidding may be inhibited by
bidders’ uncertainty about the current highest bid. Without this
information, making a bid with the goal of driving up the auction
price entails some risk of winning the auction and paying the high
price as, e.g., on eBay. We eliminate this risk of unintentionally
winning the auction by announcing publicly - just before bidders
submit their final bids - the highest bid submitted in the first stage
of the auction. This feature of our experiment not only enables us
to observe spiteful behavior per se but also allows us to quantify the
extent of feasible spitefulness: the maximally spiteful bid is the
largest bid that avoids winning the auction. This crucial element
distinguishes our setup from [22], since bidders in their
experiments know others’ values but remain uncertain about their
bids until the auction ends. Thus, a spiteful bid in their
environment still entails some risk and does not permit measure-
ment of relative spitefulness.
We informed subjects only about the highest initial bid and not
the second-highest initial bid (which would determine the price if
the auction ended then), so they could not differentiate between
auction prices that were set by competitive bidding in the initial
stage or by spiteful bidding in the final stage. This prevented
subjects from conditioning their behavior on having been harmed
because they could not even know if they were the object of spite.
This design element rules out, e.g., positive and negative
reciprocity, which were argued to drive behavior in [22].
After reviewing the highest initial bid, a subject who is not the
high bidder in the first stage can choose whether to engage in spite
(by driving up the price) or not (by keeping his bid constant), but
he may also choose to increase his bid above the highest initial bid
in an attempt to win the auction. To measure the extent of
spitefulness, it is essential that subjects frequently encounter a
decision where the latter action is undesirable, or else we would
rarely observe a choice between spiteful and non-spiteful bidding.
To increase the likelihood that a subject may decide whether to be
spiteful, we provide each bidder not winning the auction with the
opportunity to buy an item - identical to the auctioned item - at a
fixed price after the auction. Thus if the highest initial bid meets or
exceeds the (expected) fixed price, a bidder should never choose to
buy at auction and will instead wait to buy the identical item later
on, but nevertheless, each bidder has to submit a final bid.
We collected all initial bids before providing subjects with any
feedback and before beginning the second stage of any auction.
This removes the possibility that spitefulness can be justified as a
way to teach other subjects that submitting unreasonably high
initial bids can be a costly mistake. We provided feedback on the
auction outcome after all bidders submitted final bids. This
provided subjects with many opportunities to observe how spiteful
bids affected the winning bidders’ earnings so that repeated
submission of spiteful bids by the same subject cannot be dismissed
by inadvertency.
We designed this experiment as part of a research program on
price formation in auctions, unrelated to spiteful behavior. For this
reason, our design incorporates an individual choice ‘‘real effort’’
task between the auction stages and an extra decision, prior to
submitting the final bid, in which subjects may choose whether to
recall the fixed price at which they may purchase in the
aftermarket or to earn money in the ‘‘real effort’’ task.
Each experimental session consists of three stages: an ‘‘Open-
ing’’ stage in which they submit initial bids in the auction; an
‘‘Effort’’ stage in which they earn money by completing a real
effort task; and a ‘‘Closing’’ stage in which subjects submit a final
bid in the auction and then subjects who are unable to purchase an
item at auction.
In the ‘‘Opening’’ stage, each subject submits a sequence of 16
initial bids, one for each auction. For each auction, subjects
observe their induced value for the item and the fixed price at
which they will later be able to purchase. After receiving this
information for the first auction, they submit their first bid. Then
the process repeats until they have submitted initial bids for all 16
auctions.
Following the initial bids, subjects enter the ‘‘Effort’’ stage. Here
each subject participates in 3, two-minute periods of a real-effort
‘slider task’ [27] with a break of one minute in between. Subjects
observe a screen with 48 sliders, each representing a scale from 0
to 100. The sliders are initially set to ‘‘0’’, and subjects receive a
payment k~5 for each slider that they set to ‘‘50’’ by the end of
the two minutes. (We expect subjects being capable of correctly
placing 15–20 sliders in a two-minute period leading payments of
1.50–3.00 EUR over the three tasks.)
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At the end of the Effort stage, subjects enter the third and final
stage of the session in which each auction ends in the same
sequence in which the subject submitted bids in the Opening stage.
The ‘‘Closing’’ stage is divided into two sub-stages for each auction,
which we call the ‘‘Market’’ and the ‘‘Aftermarket’’. In the Market sub-
stage, subjects observe their bid and whether they are currently the
highest bidder. Then, they may submit a new bid if they desire.
However, if they want to recall the fixed price before making their
Figure 1. Time series of the relative frequencies of spiteful and maximally spiteful bids, conditional on bids being potentially
spiteful. The solid line indicates the observed relative frequency of subjects making a spiteful bid in each trial, and the dashed line indicates the
observed relative frequency of a maximally spiteful bid. Capped spikes display the standard errors of the mean in each trial. The subgraph displays
the number of opportunities to observe a spiteful bid in each trial, and suggests that the relative frequency of observing spite is not related to the
number of opportunities to be spiteful.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041812.g001
Figure 2. Histogram of measured spitefulness (Si,t), pooled over all subjects and trials. The height of each bar represents the relative
frequency of observing spitefulness in each of 50 intervals of length 0.02. Nearly 70% of the weight of the distribution is in the extreme values zero
and one, indicating that, given the opportunity, subjects are either maximally spiteful or not spiteful at all.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041812.g002
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bid, they must agree to forgo the opportunity to participate in
another minute of the slider task. Hence, by varying the value of k
in the slider task, we vary the opportunity cost of recalling the fixed
price, and we can observe the effect of opportunity cost on the
probability of overbidding in the auction. We do not discuss the
findings related to this hypothesis here, but we are currently
writing a companion paper that addresses these issues.
After each subject submits a new bid (or resubmits the original
bid), those subjects who did not choose to observe the fixed price
participate in one minute of the slider task in which each correctly
placed slider yields a return of kgroup. Those who choose to forgo
the slider task must wait quietly. At the end of the minute, the
auction immediately concludes with the highest bidder paying the
second highest bid. Each subject learns whether they were able to
purchase the good at auction, and those subjects who were
unsuccessful are then given the opportunity to purchase in the
Aftermarket sub-stage. In the Aftermarket, the fixed price is revealed to
all the remaining buyers at no cost, and subjects simply choose
whether or not to buy at the revealed price. At the end of the first
aftermarket, the second auction enters the Closing stage, and so on
until all the auctions have closed.
Each auction consists of n~3 bidders chosen from a matching
group of size N~12. For each auction, each subject receives a
randomly drawn integer value, v*U ½500,1000, and we draw the
fixed price, p*U ½300,500, so that buyers will always buy in the
aftermarket even if they are unable to buy at auction. Thus, we
can observe spite in the absence of concerns about being unable to
purchase an item. Over the sequence of 16 auctions, all four
groups face the same values and fixed price in each auction. Our
design also varies the value of k in the slider task (though this
variation does not matter for the results we report here).
Specifically, in each auction, one group of 3 bidders faces each
of kgroup[f0,5,15,30g. We rematch groups to ensure that each
bidder faces each value of k four times.
Subjects are rematched across auctions and receive no
additional information about the other bidders in their auction.
The bidder’s role is framed as that of a seller facing the
opportunity of buying several commodities in the auctions for
resale to the experimenters, one commodity per auction. One
Figure 3. The effects of the magnitude of maximum harm possible and gender on spitefulness. The panels present the data separately
for males and females. Each data point represents one observation of spitefulness relative to the magnitude of maximum harm possible.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041812.g003
Table 1. Random effects estimation of relative spitefulness Si,t.
Independent Variable Coefficient Rob. Std. Err. z p-value 95% conf. interval
Maximum Possible Harm 0.00015 0.00011 1.32 0.187 [20.00007, 0.00036]
Aftermarket Price 20.00020 0.00022 0.92 0.357 [20.00063, 0.00023]
Female 20.05767 0.11480 20.50 0.615 [20.28267, 0.16733]
Female (Max. Harm.) 20.00005 0.00014 20.37 0.708 [20.00033, 0.00022]
Trial 0.02105*** 0.00652 3.23 0.001 [0.00827, 0.03383]
Constant 0.38353*** 0.11886 3.23 0.001 [0.15058, 0.61649]
Significance levels are denoted by: 0:001, 0:01, 0:05. The random effects error structure is included for individual subjects to control for repeated measurement. A
positive and significant coefficient of Trial (t) indicates increasing spitefulness over time. Note also the insignificant coefficients on Maximum Harm, Aftermarket Price,
Female and their interaction.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041812.t001
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advantage of this framing is that it better motivates participation in
multiple auctions. In the instructions, we inform subjects that they
will learn the fixed price in the Opening stage and that they ‘‘will
have the option to review the fixed price before submitting a new
bid in the Closing stage.’’ This language avoids the implication that
the opportunity is freely available without directly revealing our
treatment variation. We also inform subjects that ‘‘if [they] are
unable to buy the item in the auction, [they] will be able to
purchase an identical item during the Aftermarket.’’ See Appendix
S1 for a complete set of instructions.
Results
We define potentially spiteful bids as all final bids that were not
directed at winning the auction (i.e. were lower than the highest
initial bid). Subjects submitted potentially spiteful bids in 383 out
of 768 instances, so we have ample opportunity to identify spite.
We call a final bid spiteful if it is both greater than the bidder’s own
initial bid and less than the highest initial bid so that it necessarily
increases the price paid by the auction winner. We call a final bid
maximally spiteful if it is exactly one bidding increment less than the
highest initial bid (e.g. if the highest initial bid was 100, a
Figure 4. Barplot time series of individual spitefulness (Si,t). Each panel displays the spite data for a single subject. Panels are sorted from top
to bottom by average spitefulness. Each bar represents the measured spitefulness of a subject in the indicated trial; if the bar has the length of a dot,
the subject had the opportunity to act spitefully but chose to be non-spiteful. Each dashed line shows a linear fit to the data for subjects classified as
behaviorally inconsistent, i.e. if the estimated coefficient of trial (t) is insignificant at a level of 5%. Out of 48 subjects, 45 had the opportunity to
submit spiteful bids. The data reveal both considerable heterogeneity in spitefulness across individuals and consistency within individuals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041812.g004
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maximally spiteful bid would be 99). Such a bid maximizes the loss
a spiteful bidder can impose on the auction winner without risk of
winning the auction. We observe abundant spite as 67:6% of all
potentially spiteful final bids are actually spiteful. Furthermore,
31:1% of potentially spiteful bids are maximally spiteful. The
frequency of observing a spiteful bid is roughly constant over trials,
but the frequency of maximally spiteful bids is increasing (Figure 1).
To facilitate inter- and intra-subject comparisons of the extent of
spitefulness, we compute the share of observed harm imposed
(price increase) by subject i in trial t out of the maximum possible
harm in that trial. Denote the initial bid and final bid by b1sti,t and
b2ndi,t and the highest initial bid by b
max
t . Spitefulness is defined as
the actual bid increase divided by the maximum possible bid
increase that implies no risk of winning the auction,
Si,t~
b2ndi,t {b
1st
i,t
(bmaxt {1){b
1st
i,t
conditional on a subject not attempting to win the auction, so that
Si,t[½0,1. The distribution of spitefulness indicates that we not
only observe spiteful bids with striking frequency, the distribution
of spitefulness is also highly skewed to both tails, indicating that
most bids are either not spiteful at all or maximally spiteful
(Figure 2). Note that for a bidder who has decided not to try to win
the auction, any bid less than the first stage high bid is, strictly
speaking, a weak best response. However, if subjects were adopting
such a strategy, we would expect them to choose each value
between their current bid and the current high bid with equal
probability. Clearly from the u-shaped distribution of spitefulness
in Figure 2, this is not the case.
Our measure of spitefulness Si,t does not distinguish between a
maximally spiteful bid that raised the final price by 2 and another
that raised the final price by 200, although the extent of
spitefulness may depend on the maximal harm that can be
imposed. However, the data suggest that the decision to be
maximally spiteful, as measured by Si,t, is independent of the
potential harm done (Figure 3). We present the data separately for
men and women to control for a potential gender effect as there is
mixed evidence on gender differences in antisocial behavior
[10,28]. Our data in both panels suggest the absence of a gender
effect.
Panel regression analysis (n~383) confirms the absence of both
magnitude and gender effects. We regress spitefulness on the
magnitude of potential harm, a gender dummy, an interaction
between female and magnitude of potential harm, the aftermarket
price, and a time (trial) trend along with a constant. The estimates
show that spitefulness is affected by neither the level of possible
harm (p-value ~0:187) nor by gender or the interaction term (p-
values ~0:615 and 0:708). We include the aftermarket price
because it may potentially affect spitefulness. For example, when
the aftermarket price is high, those bidders who do not buy in the
auction may want to raise the price paid by auction winners so that
their earnings are not substantially different. Thus, [29] observe
that in a modified dictator game, when individuals receive low
offers, some subjects are willing to incur a small cost to
substantially reduce the payoff of the other. However, we find
that spitefulness is unaffected by the aftermarket price (p-
value = 0.357); full regression output is available in Table 1.
Consistent with the increase in spitefulness over time (Figure 1),
the estimated time trend is positive and highly significant (p-value
v0:01).
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Figure 5. Scatterplots of final bids submitted by potentially spiteful bidders. Panel (a) shows the relationship between potentially spiteful
final bids and values, and panel (b) shows the relationship between such bids and the aftermarket price. Each point represents a single bid, and the
lines provide a reference showing where the bid equals each value or aftermarket price.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0041812.g005
Measuring the Distribution of Spitefulness
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 August 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 8 | e41812
Finally, we examine the heterogeneity of spitefulness between
and within individuals. While 5 subjects are maximally spiteful at
every opportunity (i.e. Si,t~1 whenever spite was possible), 6 of
them are never spiteful (i.e. Si,t~0 whenever spite was possible).
Similarly, we find that 13/45 subjects are maximally spiteful at
least 50% of the time, and 14/45 subjects are not at all spiteful at
least 50% of the time. This is markedly similar to the observed
distribution of spitefulness in Figure 2.
More generally, many subjects display striking consistency in
their level of (non-)spitefulness (Figure 4). To further evaluate
individual consistency, we estimate a simple linear regression,
separately for each subject, where the dependent variable is
spitefulness Si,t and the independent variable is trial t. We classify
a subject as behaviorally inconsistent if the regression yields a
significant estimate of the trial coefficient. By this criterion 73.3%
of our subjects display consistent levels of (non-)spitefulness. Note
that the individual stability of spitefulness appears to be
inconsistent with the significant aggregate time trend noted in
Figure 1 and Table 1; the reason we observe increasing average
spitefulness over time is that, among the individuals whose level of
spitefulness is not consistent over time, 10 out of 12 show an
increasing trend. This creates an increase in the aggregate level of
spitefulness, despite the stability of most individuals.
Discussion
One potential concern with our method of measuring spite is
that some bids which we label spiteful may result from alternative
bidding strategies. For example, bidders who discover that the
initial high bid is greater than their value have a weak best
response to bid their value, and if their initial bid is less than their
value, this strategy will produce a positive measure of spitefulness.
Similarly, bidders who know the posted aftermarket price have a
dominant strategy to bid the minimum of their value and the
posted price; here too, for a sufficiently low initial bid, a final bid
that follows this strategy will be measured as spiteful. Figure 5a
provides a scatter plot of potentially spiteful bidders’ final bids
against their values, and Figure 5b plots potentially spiteful
bidders’ final bids against the aftermarket price. Neither values nor
aftermarket prices appear to account for observed bids.
Our experiment places subjects in repeated situations in which
they choose whether to spitefully harm an anonymous other at
zero cost and in which spiteful acts are not revealed as such during
or after the interaction. Because we have access to information not
only about how much harm was imposed, but also how much
harm could have been imposed, we are able to directly measure each
individual’s level of spitefulness. In this setup we find that
spitefulness widely prevails, but its distribution is bipolar; typically
we observe either zero or maximum spitefulness. The shape of the
distribution is neither accidental nor generated by arbitrary
behavior on the part of subjects. Instead the large majority of
subjects exhibit consistent spitefulness across trials suggesting the
existence of a stable individual characteristic of (non-)spitefulness,
conditional on circumstances.
Methods
Ethics Statement
All experiments were conducted with the informed consent of
48 healthy adult subjects who were free to withdraw from
participation at any time. Only individuals who voluntarily
entered the experiment recruiting database were invited, and
informed consent was indicated by electronic acceptance of an
invitation to attend an experimental session. The experiments
were conducted following the peer-approved procedures estab-
lished by Maastricht University’s Behavioral and Experimental
Economics Laboratory (BEElab). Our study was approved by the
BEElab at a public ethics review and project proposal meeting that
is mandatory for all scholars wishing to use the BEElab facilities.
Experimental Procedures
The experiments were conducted at the BEElab of Maastricht
University with 48 students. Subjects’ decisions were fully
incentivized using Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). Their
ECU-profits were converted to EUR at a rate of 100 ECU=1
EUR and these from two randomly selected auctions were paid to
them in cash at the end of the experiment. In order to avoid the
influence of wealth effects, at the end of the experiment, we
randomly select two auctions for each subject for payment. Then
subjects receive private cash payments including a 4 EUR
payment for arriving to the experiment on time, their earnings
from the Effort stage, and their earnings from the two randomly
selected auctions (including what they earned in the slider task, if
they participated).
In total we ran 4 sessions of 12 subjects drawn from the
undergraduate population of Maastricht University (Average
age = 22.6, 46% Female). On average, subjects earned 15.32
EUR for a 60-minute session ranging from a low of 6.93 EUR to
26.65 EUR, including show-up payment. All sessions were
conducted in May 2011.
Our experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software
package [30]. Some graphics and data analysis were performed
using R, an open-source statistical software [31].
Supporting Information
Appendix S1 Instructions that were provided to experiment
subjects.
(PDF)
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